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Abstract. Household poverty is a powerful motive for child labor and working fre-
quently comes at the expense of schooling for children. Accounting for these natural
links we investigate whether and when there is an additional role for community
norms and how the social evaluation of schooling evolves over time. The proposed
model provides an explanation for why equally poor villages or regions display diﬀer-
ent attitudes towards schooling and why children who are not working are not sent
to school either but remain idle instead. The conditions for a successful implemen-
tation of a half-day school vs. a full-day school are investigated. An extension of the
model explores how an education contingent subsidy paid to the poorest families of
a community manages to initiate a bandwagon eﬀect towards an equilibrium where
all children are sent to school.
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According to UNICEF an estimated 218 million children aged 5-17 are currently engaged in
child labor, excluding child domestic labor. The common and mostly undisputed explanation
provided in the economics literature is that poverty in interaction with credit constraints and
subsistence needs forces families to let their children work (Basu, 1998, 1999, Edmonds, 2007).
While cross-country comparisons strongly conﬁrm this conjecture, within-country studies pro-
vide sometimes surprisingly little support (Psacharopolous, 1997, Ray, 2000, Bhalotra, 2006).
One possibility that can explain diﬀerent levels of child labor in countries, regions, or villages
of about the same poverty level is the prevalence of diﬀerent social norms that shape parents’
attitude towards child labor (Rodgers and Standing, 1981, Basu, 1999, Lopez-Calva, 2003).
Education and child labor are naturally interrelated because the time spent on working cannot
be spent on attendance at school or for homeworks and vice versa. This does, of course, not
necessarily imply that working precludes schooling (Edmunds, 2007). Obviously, the length of
a school day will be an important determinant for the incidence and intensity of child labor. A
half-day school reduces the child time budget by less than a full-day school and will possibly
be more attractive if children contribute a lot to family income. A full-day school, on the other
hand, if accepted, will be more successful in eliminating child labor.
The interrelation of child labor and schooling and their alleged joint determination by poverty
implies that both have to be considered simultaneously in a child time allocation problem.
A successful ban of child labor, for example, reduces family income and may thus discourage
education activities (Strulik, 2004). Subsidizing school attendance seems to be a more promising
way to utilize the trade-oﬀ between schooling and working time. Targeted transfer programs
such as Progresa in Mexico, Bolsa Escola in Brazil, and Food for Education in Bangladesh have
thus been not only aspiring to increase education but also to reduce child labor in the targeted
communities.
With respect to the schooling objective these programs have been shown to be very successful.
Interestingly, it has also been found that transfer programs – despite their success on school
attendance – have much smaller and sometimes insigniﬁcant eﬀects on child labor (Ravallion
and Wodon, 2000, Skouﬁas and Parker, 2001, Cardoso and Souza, 2004). These ﬁndings suggest
the importance of a third state of child time allocation, idleness. Obviously, the results are
compatible if subsidies made schooling attractive for families whose children were previously
1not engaged in child labor or school attending children continued to work after school at times
that they previously spent mostly on leisure and play.
Recently, two studies have evaluated the Progresa program with a diﬀerent twist, which is
particularly interesting for the present paper. Both Lalive and Cattaneo (2006) and Bobonis and
Finan (2007) ﬁnd that the subsidies did not only increase school attendance of targeted children
but also that of ineligible children when the program was introduce in their local community.
While the importance of social interaction in schooling decisions has already been investigated by
others before (e.g. Zelizer, 1985, Case and Katz, 1991) the quasi-experimental design of Progresa
was ideal to overcome identiﬁcation problems and to clearly work out the neighborhood eﬀect.
Besides demonstrating the existence of such a “social multiplier” (Glaeser et al., 2003) for the
schooling decision the studies provide a couple of other results that are interesting against the
background of the present paper. It was found that poorer families are more strongly aﬀected
by the behavior of peers, that the social interaction runs through the parents (rather than the
children) and that the strength of the response of ineligible families is increasing in the share of
eligible families.
If a social multiplier is operative, some parents are (not) sending their children to school
because others are (not) sending their children to school. A pro- or anti-schooling norm may
then be sustainable as a locally stable equilibrium. Local norms can explain some of the puzzles
of the empirical child labor-schooling literature, for example, why a Peruvian child is ceteris
paribus (i.e. in particular controlling for poverty) more likely to experience schooling than a
Pakistani child (Ray, 2000), or why in India of the rural 12 to 14 year old girls 32 percent attend
school in Uttar Pradesh but 98 percent in Kerala, a state of similar poverty (Kabeer, 2001, as
cited in Satz, 2003).
In this paper we investigate how parents solve the problem of child time allocation subject
to their poverty and the prevailing schooling norm in their community. The schooling norm
in turn depends on the share of parents who have sent their children to school in the past.
In a simplifying manner we assume that community norms aﬀect child labor only through the
schooling decision. Neglecting a separate norm for child labor could be seen as a ﬁrst order
approximation of the expectation that a norm on schooling is stronger than a norm on child
labor. A schooling norm can be more easily developed and sustained because schooling is a
binary decision (sent the girl to school or not) whereas child labor is a continuous variable to
2which it is harder to attach a speciﬁc normative value. Furthermore, the schooling decision is
very visible within the community. Children show up at school, wear uniforms and satchels, wait
with fellow pupils at the bus stop etc. Whether and how long children work cannot so easily be
monitored by others, in particular if they work at home. Finally, child labor can already be very
plausibly be motivated by economic needs. That schooling is traded oﬀ against child idleness is
much harder to explain by poverty in particular when schooling is for free.1
The paper is related to a small literature that investigate the evolution of norms within
economic models. Problems addressed so far include the growing welfare state (Lindbeck, et al.,
1999), out-of-wedlock childbearing (Nechyba, 2001), family size (Palivos, 2001), occupational
choice (Mani and Mullin, 2004), and contraceptive use (Munshi and Myaux, 2006). While the
present paper shares most with Nechyba’s article with respect to its formal approach, it is
mostly related with respect to content to the already mentioned model by Lopez-Calva (2003).
Lopez-Calva considers an anti-child labor norm and assumes that its strength depends on the
aggregate labor supply of child labor. Given a static model with homogenous households he
derives conditions for which there exist two equilibria, one without child labor, a strong anti-
child-labor norm, and a high equilibrium wage and another one where all households supply
the same eﬀort units of child labor and both anti-child-labor norm and wages are low. Both
equilibria are equally likely attained and the child labor decision is reduced to a coordination
problem.
The conditions for multiple equilibria are also the major objective of investigation in the
present paper. In a model where households are heterogeneous with respect to poverty and
susceptibility to social approval of their behavior it is shown how the existence of multiple equi-
libria depends on preferences, children’s contributions to family income, and average productiv-
ity. Which equilibrium is eventually attained – given that there are multiple ones – depends on
the communal history, i.e. the initially prevailing norm possibly modiﬁed by exogenous shocks.
This is so because the schooling norm is assumed to be determined by the number of families
who sent their children to school in the past. The backward looking behavior makes the social
equilibria locally stable and provides a strong argument for policy intervention. In particular it
can be the case that parameters of preferences and family income are such that all children in a
1Chamarbagwala (2007) investigates children’s time allocation in neighboring Indian districts. She ﬁnds spatially
correlated errors that can possibly be attributed to local attitudes and norms. At least for boys she ﬁnds stronger
spatial correlations for schooling and idleness than for child labor, which supports our intuitive argument for the
relatively higher importance of schooling norms.
3community were sent to school if there were no prevailing anti-schooling norm. With a prevail-
ing anti-schooling norm (“girls don’t belong to school”, “children of peasants don’t belong to
secondary school” etc.) only some children are sent to school, in particular those of the richer
families of the community.
The model can thus generate results were on the surface it looks as if poverty has caused
inferior schooling while at a deeper level the causes are found in the communities’ history
and evolution of norms. Through its path dependence the model is also compatible with the
observation that communities (villages or regions) of similar poverty (and equal distribution of
preferences and income) display very diﬀerent schooling behavior.
Two aspects of the model address the empirical phenomenon of child idleness. First we
investigate also equilibria where the contribution of children to family income is so low compared
to their parent’s suﬀering from letting them work that children who are not attending school
are left completely idle. Second, we investigate the introduction of a full-day school vs. a half-
day school. Comparing the success of the schooling systems is interesting because attendance
at full-day school more or less eliminates child labor whereas a half-day school allows school
attending children to work in the afternoon and probabably replaces time that was formerly
spent on leisure and play through child labor. We also investigate the seemingly convincing
looking idea to eliminate child labor through schooling in a two-step way where at the ﬁrst step
a half-day school tries to attract children in order to develop a strong pro-schooling norm and
at a second step an implementation of a full-day school utilizes this norm in order to eradicate
child labor.
In the last section the model is extended towards schooling contingent income subsides. Be-
cause the model takes the heterogeneity of households explicitly into account it is particularly
suitable to analyze targeted transfer program such as Progresa. It provides strong theoretical
support for the success of these programs and the involved social multipliers. Given a com-
munity stuck at an equilibrium where a majority of children remains uneducated we search
for the optimal design of a targeted transfer program, i.e. the share of targeted families and
the size of the subsidy that manages a transition towards an “education for all” equilibrium
at minimum costs. Numerical analysis suggests that it is always suﬃcient to target a minority
in order to change the behavior of a majority and – according with the empirical evidence –
that the subsidies needed are quite small compared to children’s potential contribution to family
4income. Minimum subsidies are particularly low if children contribute a lot to family income
and a half-day school allows them to work in the afternoon, i.e. to replace former idleness with
schooling.
2. The Model
Education can be modelled conveniently as a binary choice. Sent the children to school or
not. Child labor, with contrast, is better conceptualized as a continuous variable. Parents
decide not only whether at all but also how long their children have to work. In solving this
decision problem they consider the trade-oﬀ between the empathetically perceived disutiltiy
from letting their children work and the children’s contribution to family income. Income is
spent on consumption goods and consuming goods is an utility enhancing activity. Parents are
thus facing a trade oﬀ in time allocation for their children.
In the following we consider two variants of the basic decision problem. In the ﬁrst case child
labor and schooling are mutually exclusive (full-day school arrangement). In the second case
schoolgoers are allowed to work at most half of their time and thus perhaps less than homestayers
(half-day school arrangement). Child time can be spent on labor `, schooling h, or idleness so
that the time budget constraint is given by 1 ≥ ` + h/¯ h. The parameter ¯ h controls for the
schooling system, ¯ h = 1 for full-day school and ¯ h = 2 for half-day school. Each family consists
of one parent and one child. The parents decides upon h ∈ {0,1} where h = 1 means schooling.
Working children contribute a fraction γ of adult income per unit of labor supplied, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
Although the model is more general and gender is nowhere explicitly stated it may be helpful
for the intuition to consider the time allocation problem for girls and to conceptualize the time
endowment as one day consisting of a morning and an afternoon. The girls are probably not
supplying any wage work but are helping in the household (for example a family farm). They
are thus not showing up in the UNICEF statistics mentioned in the introduction. Girls working
` time units at home set free γ` units of extra time of their parents, which is used by their
parents to supply additional adult labor and earn wage income.2
As motivated in the introduction we assume that a social norm is attached to the schooling
decision so that individual utility depends on the social evaluation of one’s behavior. Whether
2Parents could spend the time saved through helping children on leisure. The solution of the adult’s own time
allocation problem would then provide a value of adult leisure determined by the opportunity cost of the adult
wage so that nothing of the model mechanics would be changed. For convenience we thus neglect the time
allocation problem of adults by assuming that any extra time is spent on wage work.
5not sending one’s child to school is socially approved or disapproved depends on the share of
community members (neighbors) whose children are also not attending school.3 To formalize
this notion we assume that if a parent happens to be the one and only in a community who is
not sending his child to school, he or she faces a stigma cost φ. Social disapproval decreases
in accordance with the share of neighbors whose children are also not attending school and
is eventually turning into approval. Let St denote the degree of approval of an anti-schooling
decision in period t. The complete neighborhood evaluation of an anti-schooling decision is then
given by (St − φ).
People are to diﬀerent degrees susceptible to the evaluation of their behavior by others. We
capture this fact by assuming that susceptibility to approval is distributed within the unit
interval. A parent i has susceptibility to approval σ(i) ∈ [0,1]. The most self-assured parent
is assigned with value “0” and the most indeterminate one with value “1”. For simplicity we
assume a uniform distribution. Summarizing, social utility experienced by parent i for a “no
education” decision is given by σ(i) · (St − φ).
Like the related literature mentioned in the introduction the model is not complete in the
sense that it does not provide a deeper explanation for why the social norm existed in the ﬁrst
place. Utilizing the background story from above once more, we suppose that at model-time t0
a fraction of girls were not attending school (probably because there was no school, or no school
for girls, or no separate toilet for girls at school) which “explains” the initial strength of the
social attitude that girls do not belong to school, S0.
The autonomous, socially independent part of preferences with respect to consumption ct(i)
and child labor is captured by a Cobb-Douglas utility function ct(i)1−α[1 − `t(i) + aht(i)/¯ h]α.
The parameter α measures empathy, i.e. the weight that parents put on child labor relative
to own consumption, 0 < α < 1. For α = 0 we have totally insensitive parents caring only
about consumption and the evaluation of their behavior by the community. As α rises parents
increasingly suﬀer from letting their children work. The parameter a measures how parents
evaluate schooling versus leisure of their children. For a > 0 generally empathetic parents get
extra utility from schooling compared to leisure.
3Alternatively we might assume that the value of a pro-schooling decision (in terms of parental utility) is learned
from observing the schooling decision of neighbors.
6Putting the autonomous and social elements of utility together, parent i in period t faces the
following utility function.
ut(i) = ct(i)1−α[1 − `t(i) + aht(i)/¯ h]α + [1 − ht(i)] · σ(i) · (St − φ). (1)
To begin with, we neglect schooling subsidies in order to work out the main mechanics of
the model easily. They are introduced later in an extension of the basic model. With foregone
contributions of child work to family income being the only cost of a pro-schooling decision and
w(i) denoting the adult income of family i the budget constraint of family i for period t reads
w(i) + γw(i)`t(i) = ct(i). (2)
Parents who are not educating their children set ht = 0. They solve the maximization of (1)
w.r.t. (2) and the budget constraint for their children’s time, 0 ≤ `t ≤ 1. For a parent i this
provides the optimal choices




ct(i) = (1 − α)(1 + γ) · w. (3b)
Inspection shows that `t(i) ≤ 1. Only totally insensitive parents (α = 0) would let their children
work all of the time. Empathetic parents leave their children some spare time. Since ` ≥ 0 we
see that the following condition has to hold for the incidence of child labor.





Child labor does not exist if children contribute suﬃciently little to family income (small γ)
and parents are suﬃciently empathetic (large α). For most parts of the paper we assume that
Assumption 1 holds implying that children who do not go to school work at least some of their
time. In a later section we consider the schooling decision when Assumption 1 does not hold,
i.e. without the incidence of child labor. This case is interesting in order to investigate whether
an enforceable ban of child labor (γ = 0) necessarily causes schooling or whether parents prefer
to leave their children completely idle.
7Parents who let their children attain school set ht(i) = 1. Under a full-day school arrangement
this immediately solves the time allocation problem. The solution is `t(i) = 0 and ct(i) = w(i).
Under a half-day school arrangement maximization of (1) subject to (2) provides the interior
solution
`t(i) = (1 − α)(1 + a/2) − α/γ (5a)
ct(i) = w(i)(1 − α)[1 + γ(1 + a/2)]. (5b)
Inspection of (5a) shows that children who attain a half-day school work more than those who
are not attending school if a > 0. In this case the extra utility from letting the children attain
school (vis a vis leaving them idle) is traded oﬀ against longer working hours for children after
school. If `t(i) > 1/2 according to (5a) a corner solution applies that ﬁxes the choice variables
to `t(i) = 1/2 and ct(i) = w(i)(1 + γ/2). We discuss the interior solution where parents give
up “only” child leisure later in the “Idle Children” section. The corner solution, on which we
now focus, is more interesting for a comparison of schooling systems. For education under a
full-day schooling arrangement parents have to give up child labor completely whereas at the
corner solution for a half-day school arrangement they have to give up some but not all child
labor in order to get their children educated.
Comparing utilities (1) derived from sending the children to full-day school versus enjoying
child leisure and contributions to family income according to (3) we ﬁnd that the child of family
i is not attending school in period t if








·w(i)1−α ≤ σ(i) · (St − φ). (6)
The left hand side of (6) captures the individual, socially-independent, i.e. “ordinary”, net utility
experienced from a pro-schooling decision. Ceteris paribus, this utility is lower for poorer parents
(with low w(i)). The constant EF summarizes the “marginal value of education”, i.e. the net
utility increase experienced from a pro-schooling decision that an additional unit of w(i)1−α
brings about. We see that socially-independent utility is negative if parents do not receive
extra utility vis a vis child leisure, i.e. EF < 0 for a = 0. The right hand side of (6) reﬂects
socially dependent utility stemming from the evaluation of parent i’s pro-schooling decision by
the community.
8Likewise, given a half-day school and the corner solution for school attending children (` = 1/2)
















·w(i)1−α ≤ σ(i) · (St − φ). (7)
Again, child labor is more prevalent among poor households. Inspection of the marginal edu-
cation value EH shows that an extra gain from schooling vis a vis child leisure (a > 0) is not
necessary for schooling to exist because participants of half-day school are also contributing
to family income through work in the afternoon. From this feature one might be tempted to
conclude that families with working children always prefer a half-day school. Interestingly, this
is not generally the case. Comparison of the marginal education values EH and EF proves the
following.
Lemma 1. Ceteris paribus parents are more inclined to let their children attain school if they
face a half-day school (instead of a full-day school) if γ/2 > 2α/(1−α) − 1.
Only if children contribute suﬃciently much to family income (large γ) and parents feel
suﬃciently little empathy with their working children (small α) a half-day school is preferred
against a full-day school. Note that a has to be suﬃciently large for EF > 0, i.e. for a full-
day school to be a relevant option in the ﬁrst place. Lemma 1 thus states that if schooling
is suﬃciently worthwhile and child labor income is small anyway, empathetic parents prefer to
send their children to school for the full day.
In order to proceed we assume that parameters are such that the marginal education values
EF and EH are positive. If they were zero or negative there would be no be schooling in an
“ordinary” model without socially dependent preferences (i.e. when σ(i) = 0 for all i at the right
hand sides of (6) and (7)). The positivity assumption thus helps to focus on the role of social
preferences for schooling and child labor.
Assumption 2 (Schooling Feasibility). The model parameters a,α,γ, are such that EF > 0
and EH > 0, i.e. such that schooling would exist without socially dependent preferences.
We can prove the following for the value of education.
9Lemma 2. Assume child labor and schooling are feasible. (a) Socially-independent utility from
sending one’s child to school is increasing in empathy and the valuation of schooling relative to
idleness for both schooling systems, i.e. ∂Ej/∂a > 0 and ∂Ej/∂α > 0 for j ∈ {F,H}.
(b) Higher children’s contribution to family income reduces socially-independent utility from
education under a full-day school arrangement but raises it under a half-day school arrangement,
i.e. ∂EF/∂γ < 0 and ∂EH/∂γ > 0.
The proof with respect to a is obvious from inspection of (6) and (7), the proofs for α and
γ are in the Appendix. While result (a) is not surprising, result (b), showing that child labor
income has opposing eﬀects depending on the school arrangement faced by the family, is more
interesting. A half day school becomes more attractive when children contribute more to family
income through their work in the afternoon. This implies, for example, that a successful anti-
child labor campaign that manages to set γ below α/(1 − α) would rises the value of full-day
schooling by reducing its opportunity costs but it would be counter-productive to schooling if
parents have a half-day school option.
Finally, we introduce a distinction between poverty of a speciﬁc family i and poverty of whole
community by setting w(i) = (i)A. Here, A is understood as an index of general productivity of
the community and (i) is the poverty index of family i. In order to enable an analytical solution
we assume that the ideosyncratic parameter  is uniformly and independently distributed within
the unit interval. Summarizing the previous results we can state that the child of family i is not
attending school if








, j ∈ {F,H}. (8)
The right hand side of (8) deﬁnes the critical poverty index ¯  below which parents are not sending
their children to school. It is the community-speciﬁc threshold that separates households with
educated children from households with uneducated ones. We see that the general assertion and
frequently observed result that poverty aﬀects education and that it are the poorest parents who
are most likely not sending their children to school remains, in principle, be true. Yet, here it
gets a qualiﬁcation.
The schooling decision depends also on the general level of community (dis-) approval and the
individual susceptibility to community norms. In particular, there can be some relatively rich,
highly indeterminate, approval-dependent parents who are not sending their children to school
10if school participation is against the social norm of their neighborhood. On the other hand,
there can be some relatively poor parents who are not giving much on community norms against
schooling and send their children to school although non-education would receive community
approval. Figure 1 visualizes this result by showing the threshold in a σ − -diagram. The area
below the threshold gives the share of children who are not attending school in period t, which
we denote by θt. For a given value of σ it are always the children of poor parents who are not
participating in school. However, since σ is independently distributed among income levels there
may be also some rich parents who leave their children at home. In particular, if the community
norm St is very strong, there exist some parents with very high susceptibility to social evaluation
of their behavior who leave their children at home irrespective of their poverty. Formally, in this
case there exists a ¯ σ < 1 for which ¯ (¯ σ) = 1, i.e. ¯ σ ≡ A1−αEj/(St − φ). Otherwise ¯ σ = 1, see
Figure 1.










Parents are distinguished by poverty index  ∈ [0,1], with
 = 1 identifying the richest parent, and by susceptibility
to community approval σ ∈ [0,1], with σ = 1 reﬂect-
ing the highest susceptibility. The share of children not
attending school in period t is t is θt.











dσ+(1−¯ σ) = 1−
EjA1−α
t
(2 − α)(St − φ)
= θ(St), j ∈ {F,H}. (9)
11Inspection of (9) and using Lemma 2 proves the following comparative statics for the share of
uneducated children in a community.
Proposition 1. Assume child labor is feasible. (a) The share of uneducated children is
increasing in community approval of an “anti-education” decision (St). It is decreasing in general
empathy (α), in the parental evaluation of the importance of schooling compared to idleness (a),
in stigma costs (φ), and in average productivity (income) of the community (A).
(b) An increasing contribution of child labor to family income (γ) leads, ceteris paribus, to a
higher share of uneducated children under a full-day school and to a lower share of uneducated
children under a half-day school.
3. The Evolution of Community Norms
A community’s evaluation of behavior is not a given constant but evolves as a lagged endoge-
nous variable depending on the observation of aggregate behavior. The results obtained so far
were just providing a snapshot of the socio-economy for given St. In order to proceed we assume
that community approval of an anti-schooling decision depends positively on the share of parents
who were not sending their children to school in the past. Let δ denote the time preference rate
or rate of oblivion by which these observations are depreciated in mind so that approval is given
by St = (1−δ)
P∞
i=0 θt−1−i. Alternatively, this can be written as the period-by-period evolution
of approval,
St = (1 − δ) · θt−1 + δ · St−1. (10)
A social equilibrium is obtained where the social norm, i.e. the level of community approval,
stays constant, which requires St = θt. Inserting the equilibrium condition St = θt into (9) we
obtain the polynomial
θ2
t − θt(1 + φ) + φ + EjA1−α/(2 − α) = 0, (11)
which has at most two real, positive solutions whose evaluation leads to the following result.




(1 − φ)2(2 − α), j ∈ {F,H} (12)
12then there exists a long-run social equilibrium where not all children attain school. In this case






















The equilibrium θmid is unstable. The equilibria θlow and θhigh are locally stable.
Proof. The solution of (11) is θhigh and θmid. Since θ ∈ [0,1] the radicand has to be non-negative,
which requires (12) to hold. For stability consider the St – θt diagram in Figure 2. Equilibria
are found along the 45-degree line where θt = St. Note that St is rising above the 45-degree
line and falling below according to the evolution of community approval described in (10). The
share θt is given by the concave curve displaying the θ(St) curve according to (9). This curve
hits the abscissa at St ≡ ¯ S = φ + A1−αEj/(2 − α)β > 0, cuts the 45-degree line from below
at θmid and then again from above at θhigh. Thus the equilibrium θhigh is locally stable and
the equilibrium θmid is unstable. If θt happens to be below θmid the social dynamics converge
towards the origin where all children are educated (θ = θlow = 0). 
It has been shown in the last section that, given St, poor households are more prone to leave
their children at home. Here, we see that aggregate poverty (low productivity A) at community
level is also detrimental to schooling. Thus, poverty remains an important determinant of non
participation in school and child labor. But Figure 2 also shows that two communities sharing
the same average poverty level and the same distribution of income (and the same preferences
and technology) can end up in diametral opposed equilibria. The community starting with
a relatively low initial θ, θ < θmid, converges to complete education, whereas the community
starting with θ > θmid ends up in an equilibrium with a high share of uneducated children. In
other words, socio-economic history explains a community’s attitude towards schooling today
and thus helps to sustain an anti- or pro-schooling culture.
Some communities are more prone to end up with little education than others. Inspecting the
derivatives of (12) and of θhigh and using Lemma 2 proves the following comparative statics of
the equilibrium share of uneducated children.
















St ∈ [0,1] denotes community approval of schooling in
season t evolving according to (10). The share of parents
not sending their children to school is given by θ(St) ac-
cording to (9). Arrows indicate the direction of motion
of St over time.
Proposition 3. Given any initial share of children not attending school, θ0. (a) The possibil-
ity that non-participation in school exists at social equilibrium and the share of not participating
children at such an equilibrium increase with decreasing average productivity of the community
(A), decreasing empathy (α), decreasing parental evaluation of schooling vis a vis idleness (a),
and decreasing stigma costs (φ).
(b) The possibility that non-participation in school exists at social equilibrium and the share of
not participating children at such an equilibrium increases if child contributions to family income
(γ) increase under a full-day school arrangement and if contributions decrease under a half-day
school arrangement.
Diagrammatically, the above changes of parameters shift the θ(St)–curve to the left.
If a community has arrived successfully at the equilibrium θlow = 0, the resulting pro-schooling
norm is very robust as the following result shows.
Proposition 4. If the social equilibrium of complete schooling (θlow) is attained, the socio-
economy remains there irrespective of variation of child labor’s potential contribution to family
income (γ), general productivity (A), and other parameter changes.
14The proof follows immediately from noting that ¯ S > 0 in Figure 2 as long as Assumption 2
holds. In fact, even unfortunate parameter changes that lead to a violation of Assumption 2
may not cause the community to leave the all-schooling equilibrium if stigma costs φ for the ﬁrst
mover out of the equilibrium are suﬃciently high so that ¯ S remains positive. In other words, once
the community has developed a pro-schooling norm, education is more robust against negative
shocks than it would be if parents had socially independent preferences. A negative shock (i.e.
a bad harvest) that would induce socially independent parents to abandon schooling in favor of
child labor does not aﬀect schooling in social equilibrium because of the stigma attached to an
anti-schooling decision.
A frequently addressed question in the literature is whether the introduction of schooling
can eradicate child labor. Since a compulsory and enforceable participation at full-day school
eliminates child labor instantaneously, schooling has to be voluntary or non-enforceable for
this to be an interesting question. In that case families without socially dependent preferences
would accept the education supply whenever this is individually preferred, i.e. whenever EF is
positive. With socially dependent preferences the issue is not so straightforward. Since there
was no schooling in the status quo ante, community approval for an anti-education decision can
be expected to be high initially. Probably we start in a situation where S0 = θ0 = 1. For the
successful introduction of a school the θ(St)-curve has to be situated suﬃciently far down so that
there are no intersections with the identity line, implying that (12) is not fulﬁlled. One sees that
having a positive education value EF is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for schooling
of a community at large. Possibly, extra eﬀort is needed in order to overcome a prevailing
anti-schooling norm.
This extra eﬀort, which could be supplements to family income (captured in a stylized way
as rising A) must not be of inﬁnite duration. A temporary downward shift of the θ(St) curve
is enough. Once the share of non-educated children falls below θmid, income supplements can
be terminated since the community has developed a suﬃciently strong pro-schooling norm. The
bandwagon eﬀect (Granovetter, 1973) has generated enough momentum. Because of decreasing
community approval St for an anti-schooling decision, more and also poorer parents send their
children to school next period. With further decreasing St approval turns into disapproval
eventually and at ¯ S all parents let their children attend school.
15In order to abolish child labor through schooling, a two-step policy might appear reasonable.
As a ﬁrst step a half-day school is implemented so that parents accepting the schooling oﬀer can
still let their children do some work in the afternoon. If the policy is successful, the intersection
at θhigh becomes non-existent, parents are increasingly starting to educate their children and
the community converges towards θlow where a pro-schooling norm prevails. Now, facing an
established pro-schooling norm, it can be that parents may prefer a full-day school vis a vis no
education and the change from half-day to full-day school eliminates child labor entirely.
The left panel of Figure 3 shows by example that this scenario is indeed possible. Numerical
values of parameters are chosen such that children contribute much to family income (γ = 0.7),
parents are not so empathetic (α = 0.2) but at the margin an anti-schooling decision is quite
strongly stigmatized (φ = 0.4). Starting without a school, i.e. with no parent educating their
children and thus a lot of approval for an anti-schooling decision, the introduction of a full-day
school is not successful. Only a minority, i.e. a share of 1 − θhigh of rich and socially relatively
independent parents (endowed with high  and/or low σ values) let their children attend school.
The majority of families in the community leave their children at home.
With contrast, a half day school can be successfully implemented. Parents who let their
children attend school also let them work in their afternoon so that foregone family income
from a pro-education decision is relatively small. There exists no intersection with the identity
line and the dashed curve representing the social norm θ(St). After introduction of the half-
day school a bandwagon eﬀect sets in and more and more children are going to school. With
more children attending school a pro-schooling norm develops. Once the pro-schooling norm
is suﬃciently strong (i.e. when θ crosses θmid) the pro-schooling norm has grown suﬃciently
large that a transition to a full day school is possible. In other words, social disapproval for an
anti-schooling decision is now suﬃciently strong so that parents prefer schooling even when they
have to abandon child labor completely for letting their children attend school.
Unfortunately, in general, the policy conclusions to be drawn are less straightforward than
one might infer from the example. In fact, just the opposite result can also be produced, i.e.
an example where parents who would sent their children to a full-day school but leave them at
home when there is only a half-day school available. In order to construct such a “degenerate”
case we assume that children contribute relatively little to family income (γ = 0.45) parents are
somewhat empathetic (α = 0.3) and the marginal stigma cost of an anti-schooling decision is
16relatively small (φ = 0.2). The right panel of Figure 3 shows that the dashed curve, representing
the schooling norm given a half-day school, is now intersecting the identity line whereas no such
intersection exists for the full-day schooling norm represented by the solid line.
The intuition for these results follows from Lemma 2. If children contribute relatively little to
family income, suﬃciently empathetic parents prefer a full-day school versus a half-day school.
In that case, the share of parents sending their children to school immediately, i.e. irrespective
of the initially prevailing anti-schooling norm, is larger under a full-day school option. If it is
suﬃciently larger, it initiates a bandwagon eﬀect towards a pro-schooling norm that cannot be
realized by a half-day school arrangement where initially fewer parents are motivated to take up
schooling.
While children’s contributions to family income can perhaps be measured suﬃciently precisely
we can expect more parameter uncertainty about the strength of norms (φ) and empathetic
feelings (α). Not knowing which schooling system can be expected to be more successful in
overcoming an anti-schooling norm, it could be wise to provide both options, at least during an
initial period.



















Model parameters: A = 1, a = 1.5 and α = 0.2, γ = 0.7, φ = 0.4 for the left panel and α = 0.3, γ = 0.45,
φ = 0.2 for the right panel. Solid lines show θ(St) curves for a full-day school. Dashes lines show θ(St)
curves for a half-day school.
4. Idle Children
We are now turning towards the case where Assumption 1 does not hold, i.e. we assume that
working children would contribute suﬃciently little to family income and parents are suﬃciently
empathetic so that child labor does not exist. Idle children, however, do not necessarily imply
17that a free schooling oﬀer is “automatically” accepted by the community. Inspection of utilities





·w(i)1−α ≤ σ(i) · (St − φ). (13)
Replacing Ej by EL in (8) – (12) it is straightforward to see that all previous results – apart
from the statements about child labor income – remain valid. In particular, if parents do not
get enough extra value out of the education of their children compared to child leisure and play
(small a) they prefer to leave their children completely idle as long as a suﬃciently strong anti-
schooling norm (St − φ) prevails. This outcome helps to explain the coexistence of a schooling
option and the incidence of idle children without to resort on schooling costs. Furthermore, the
result is important in the following context. Imagine that large contributions from child labor
in the past have driven the community in a situation where an anti-schooling decision gets a lot
of social approval (St is large). Then, even when schooling is for free (as currently assumed), an
enforceable child labor ban setting γ to zero does not induce schooling if condition (13) holds.
Without employing a schooling costs argument, however, the existence of norms is essential in
explaining the incidence of idle children. If there were no social preferences (i.e. σ(i) = 0 for all
i) the right hand side of (13) would be zero and – given the positivity of the left hand side – the
condition were never fulﬁlled.
Interestingly, for given susceptability σ poorer families are again more prone to leave their
children at home although there are no longer opportunity cost in form of foregone child labor
income. This result is now simply reﬂecting the fact that poorer families can spend less income
on consumption and thus experience less utility from consumption (w(i)1−α) so that the social
evaluation of their behavior becomes – for given σ(i) – relatively more important for their
decisions and they are more inﬂuenced by a prevailing anti-schooling norm in their community
than richer families.
5. Targeted Transfers
Next, let us consider whether and how exogenously provided development aid in form of
income subsidies can move a community out of an anti-schooling equilibrium. The case of
extensive, unconditional transfers is trivial and has already been addressed brieﬂy in Section
3. A suﬃciently high increase of average income A eliminates the anti-schooling equilibrium.
18Suﬃcient here means that income transfers increase the value of education for a critical mass of
families so their pro-schooling decision together with the initiated bandwagon eﬀect towards a
pro-schooling norm eliminates the equilibrium θhigh and puts the community on a path towards
the “education for all” equilibrium. But then, of course, the rise of A might not be suﬃcient.
In that case too few families take up schooling for the anti-schooling norm to vanish. The
norm curve shifts downward but the equilibrium θhigh continues to exist. Such a scenario may
explain why unconditional transfers have often been observed as unsuccessful with respect to
the intended change of schooling behavior.
More successful have been targeted transfers (see the Introduction), a policy design which
is also theoretically more interesting. Targeted transfers like the programs of Progresa, Bolsa
Escola, or Food for Education are characterized by two salient features. They are paid contingent
on behavior, e.g. children showing up at school, and they are addressed to only a subset of a
community, usually the poor families. These features render the current model particularly
suitable for a theoretical investigation because heterogeneity of the population w.r.t. poverty
and schooling attitude is explicitly taken into account. Particularly interesting here is the
question of whether and how targeted transfers received by only the poorest families manage
to aﬀect the schooling behavior of a community at large through the spillover of behavior from
targeted families to others. Formally, this leads to a problem of optimal design of the transfer
program, i.e. the question how many families should receive subsidies and how generous the
payment should be in order to initiate a successful transition towards the “education for all”
equilibrium and simultaneously minimize costs of the program.
Suppose that the poorest families of a community are selected to receive an income subsidy
of size s contingent on their children going to school. Let p denote the number, i.e. community
share, of eligible families. For convenience we normalize average productivity, A = 1. Keeping
everything else from the basic model, assuming that child labor is feasible (Assumption 1 holds),
and comparing utilities given a full-day school option we ﬁnd that the child of family i will not
attend school in period t if the following condition holds.
(w(i) + sp)






Here, sp is a binary variable. sp = s > 0 if w(i) < p and ht(i) = 1 and sp = 0 otherwise. If sp
were zero for all w, condition (14) would collapse to (6). Condition (14) evaluated with equality
19provides the threshold between educated and uneducated children, which is now conveniently






1−α · (1 + a)α − λ · w1−α
i
(15)
for St > φ and ¯ σ = 1 otherwise.
As before, parents are more likely to keep their children uneducated if they are poor (low
w(i) for given σ(i)) and if they are susceptible to social approval (high σ(i) for given w(i)).
There are, however, two important diﬀerences between the basic and the current version of the
model. First, schooling subsidies have shifted the threshold upwards so that a positive share ˜ σ
of the poorest families let their children attend school, ˜ σ ≡ s1−α(1 + a)α/(St − φ). Second, the
threshold is discontinuous. A structural break occurs at the point where families with income
above p lose eligibility for transfers.
Figure 4: Education Threshold for Two Targeted Transfer Programs


























Model parameters are A = 1, a = 1.5 and α = 0.25, γ = 0.45, φ = 0.2, and St = 0.6. Left panel:
s = 0.1 and p = 0.1. Right panel: s = 0.02 and p = 0.5. The dotted line shows the threshold
without targeted transfers.
Figure 4 visualizes how the design of transfers shapes the threshold and determines the share of
uneducated children in a community at time t. If transfers are generous but paid only to a small
share of families (s is large relative to p), the share of the poorest families who are persuaded to
educate their children is large but so is the behavioral jump at the point of discontinuity. Such
an example is shown in the left panel. Here, a subsidy of s = 0.1 is received by the poorest 10
percent of families of the community contingent on a pro-education decision, i.e. p = 0.1. One
sees that under the currently prevailing norm (St = 0.6) about 45 percent of the poorest families
are persuaded to send their children to school. On the other hand, if transfers are small but many
20families are eligible, the impact on behavior is relatively small at every targeted level of poverty
but so is the behavioral change when already relatively rich families lose eligibility. The right
hand panel shows such a case. There, 50 percent of the community are eligible for a schooling
contingent transfer of s = 0.02. In short, a high–s–low–p policy changes the behavior of many
people within a small income bracket whereas a low–s–high–p policy changes the behavior of
few at any given level of income but this over a larger domain of poverty levels.
The parameters of transfer policy, s and p, interact in the determination of the share of
uneducated children θt and the overall costs of the project. If the project works in the sense
that targeted families send their children to school, total costs are given by
R p
0 sdw = p·s. The
two policies shown in Figure 4, for example, imply the same project costs if all eligible families
take up schooling. A diﬀerent split up of the same project costs ps usually leads to diﬀerent
success measured by the additional share of children actually brought to school, visible as the
area between solid and dotted lines in Figure 4. For an overall assessment of the success of
a project, however, an inspection of thresholds as shown in Figure 4 is inappropriate. These
are just a snapshot pictures of society at one arbitrary value of social approval. For a deﬁnite
judgement of success we have to consider the long-run social equilibrium where St = θt. There, it
is particular interesting whether a transfer project creates enough behavioral change to initiate
a transition towards the “education for all” equilibrium.
In order to prepare an investigation of equilibrium eﬀects we step-wise integrate the area
below the threshold.






1−α · (1 + a)α − λw1−αdw +
Z ¯ w
p
w1−α · (1 + a)α − λw1−αdw

+ (1 − ¯ w),
where ¯ w = min(1,[(St − φ)/((1 + a)α − λ]
1/(1−α). Solving for θ we obtain the share of unedu-
cated children at time t.
θt = 1 −
EFS
(2 − α)(St − φ)
(16)
EFS ≡ (1 + a)α 
1 + (p + s)2−α − s2−α − p2−α	
− λ + µF,
where the constant µF ≡ (2 − α)( ¯ w − 1) + ( ¯ w2−α − 1)[(1 + a)α − λ] is independent of the
design of the transfer program with µF = 0 for ¯ w = 1. Here, EFS denotes the average value of
21education at full-day school when there are targeted schooling subsidies. It is the counterpart
to the marginal value of education EF in the benchmark model, which can easily be veriﬁed by
comparing (16) with (9).
Results are similarly obtained when parents face a half-day school. Comparing utilities and


















− λ · w1−α

(17)
for St > φ and ¯ σ = 1 otherwise. Step-wise integration of the area below the threshold and
solving for θt provides the share of uneducated children at time t when there is a half-day school
option.
θt = 1 −
EHS







s + p(1 + γ/2)1−α2−α − s2−α
(1 + γ/2)1−α + (1 + γ/2)1−α(1 − p2−α)
)
− λ + µH,
with policy independent constant µH ≡ (2−α)( ¯ w−1)+( ¯ w2−α−1){[(1+a)/2]α(1+γ/2)1−α−λ}.
Inspection of derivatives veriﬁes the intuition about how generosity of and eligibility for transfers
aﬀects the value of education.
Lemma 3. The average value of education is increasing in the generosity of transfers and in
the share of targeted recipients for both full-day and half-day school. ∂EjS/∂s > 0, ∂EjS/∂p > 0,
j ∈ {F,H}.
From here, equilibrium analysis commences as for the basic version of the model. Following
the proof of Proposition 2 it is straightforward to show that an equilibrium with prevailing




(1 − φ)2(2 − α), j ∈ {F,H}.
Applying Lemma 3 we see that a larger p or s reduces the set of parameters for preferences and
child contributions to family income (a, α, and γ) for which an anti-schooling equilibrium exists,
which proves the following intuitive result.
Proposition 5. If transfers s are suﬃciently high and the share of targeted recipients p is
suﬃciently large, the anti-schooling equilibrium ceases to exist.
22More interesting and not so straightforward is the question which targeted transfer policy
is best, i.e. which combination of p and s minimizes costs and “just” moves a socio-economy
out of θhigh so that it converges towards the “education for all” equilibrium. Formally, we are
interested in the solution of the following problem
min




(1 − φ)2(2 − α), j ∈ {F,H}. (19)
From the ﬁrst order conditions we arrive at a result with a familiar structure (from Gossen’s
second law).
Proposition 6. If a targeted transfer program is optimally designed, the ratio of eligible
recipients relative to generosity, p/s, is equal to the ratio of marginal changes of the value of






, j ∈ {F,H}. (20)




(p + s)1−α − p1−α
(p + s)1−α − s1−α ⇒ p = s. (21)
Generosity and eligibility aﬀect the average value of education symmetrically so that the optimal
design requires equality of p and s. In other words, the model suggests that a schooling project
that targets a large share of the population with small transfers (or vice versa) is ill-designed.
Either it does not move the economy out of the bad equilibrium or, if it is successful, there exists
a cheaper transfer design with the same eﬀect.





(s + xp)1−α − xp1−α
x
(s + xp)1−α − s1−α (22)
with x ≡ (1 + γ/2)1−α and thus, as shown in the Appendix, s > p. Subsidies to poor families
should be larger than the range of eligibility under a half-day school because school attending
children continue to work in the afternoon and contribute 1/2 · γw(i) to family income. Thus,
richer households are relatively easily induced to send their children to school by a changing
23schooling norm. Because their schooling decision depends relatively less on monetary subsidies
compared to social evaluation, transfers should be more strictly targeted to the poor.
In order to assess how much should be spend and how many families should be targeted we
solve the two equations (19) and (21) for s and p [equations (19) and (22) in case of a half-day
school]. Given the non-linear shape, this can be done, unfortunately, only numerically. The
most interesting parameter with respect to which the project design can be investigated is γ,
the children’s contribution to family income. Using a characteristic example, Figure 5 illustrates
the optimal project design, i.e. the cost minimizing choice of p and s that produces a transition
towards “education for all”. For alternative values of child contribution to income, the left panel
shows the solution for full-day school and the right panel for half day school. Solid lines reﬂect
the optimal share of targeted families and dashed lines the optimal size of the transfer. As
shown above, both coincide in case of a full-day school.4 The numerical solution reveals that
they lie also quite close together in case of a half-day school.
Figure 5: Optimal Targeted Transfers for Alternative Child Labor Contribution to Family Income


















Model parameters are a = 2, α = 0.2, φ = 0.2. Solid lines: population share of eligible families,
dashed lines: size of the subsidy. Left panel: full day school, right panel: half-day school.
In Section 3 we had derived that the value of education is decreasing in children’s contributions
to family income when families face a full-day school but increasing under a half-day school
option (and child work in the afternoon). This feature of opportunity costs implies that optimal
schooling subsidies and share of targeted families are increasing in γ for the full-day school
option but are decreasing for the half-day school option. While this is generally true, the curves
4Not shown is the optimal policy when γ < α/(1−α) so that child labor does not exist. In this case the best choices
are independent from γ. Given the preferences underlying Figure 5 the threshold between work and idleness is at
γ = 0.25 and the best transfer policy to bring idle children to school at minimum cost is p = s = 0.12.
24are shifted downwards, i.e. an “education for all” equilibrium is realized at lower costs, when
schooling becomes intrinsically more important for parents (a rises), or social stigma of an
anti-schooling decision rises (φ rises), or parents are more empathetic (higher α).
The most important ﬁnding, however, is how small the optimally targeted population share is
that eliminates the anti-schooling equilibrium. For an assessment recall from Proposition 2 that
at an anti-schooling equilibrium a majority of families is not sending their children to school.
Otherwise, an anti-schooling norm could not be sustained. For the examples shown in Figure
5 between 65 and 95 percent of children do not attend school at the initial equilibrium θhigh.
To induce schooling for all, however, it is suﬃcient to target only between 5 and 30 percent of
the families. The initial change of behavior of a few families is suﬃciently large to initiate a
bandwagon eﬀect, i.e. a perpetual change of the degree of social approval of an anti-schooling
decision and the share of school attending children. At the end a pro-schooling attitude is held
by everybody and all children are sent to school.
It is also worth noting that the minimum size of the subsidy that produces a successful
transition is always smaller than γ and almost always smaller than γ/2, the average contribution
of child work to family income. Thus, with respect to both size of the subsidy and number of
targeted recipients surprisingly little eﬀort is needed in order to create strong behavioral changes
of a community at large. Nevertheless, in case of a half-day school, the project has relatively little
impact on child labor since children who are attracted to school are replacing leisure and play
in the afternoon by work. These results are well in accordance with recent empirical research
on targeted transfer programs but probably hard to produce within a standard model lacking
the mechanism of a social multiplier.
6. Final Remarks
In this paper we have investigated the interaction of individual poverty and community norms
in the determination of child labor, schooling, and idleness. While maintaining to deliver the
well-known association between schooling and individual and aggregate poverty the theory is
additionally able to resolve some puzzles from the empirical literature, e.g. while regions of
same poverty display very diﬀerent schooling behavior and why and how idleness can explain
that taking up schooling has frequently little eﬀect on child labor. It is explained how policy can
initiate a bandwagon eﬀect toward an “education for all” equilibrium utilizing the endogenous
25evolution of norms. The theory strongly supports targeted transfer programs by showing that
relatively small behavior-contingent transfers to a minority can change the schooling behavior
of a community at large.
The theory is not claiming to replace poverty-based and other available approaches towards
child labor and schooling. Instead, credit constraints (Baland and Robinson, 2000), bonded
child labor (Basu and Chau, 2004), political economy elements (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2005),
fertility (Hazan and Berdugo, 2002), and child mortality (Strulik, 2004) constitute conceivable
future extensions of the community-norms based model of schooling and child labor.
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comments.
26Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.
∂EF
∂γ
= −(1 − α)1−ααα 
γ−α − αγ−α−1(1 + γ)

The term in square brackets is positive for




i.e. ∂EF/∂γ < 0 under Assumption 1.
∂EF
∂α





[1 + log(1 − α) − 1 − log(α/γ)].
















+ log(1 + γ)
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[1 + log(1 − α) − 1 − log(α/γ)].
From (5a) we conclude that the corner solution EH fulﬁls (1 − α) − (α/γ) + (1 − α)a/2 ≥ 1/2.
And since γ > α/(1−α) for child labor to exist (Assumption 1), the corner condition necessarily
fulﬁlls (1 − α)a/2 > 1/2 and thus log[(1 + a)/2] > 0. The term in curly braces is thus positive.


















































The term in square brackets is smaller than one because of Assumption 1. Thus ∂EH/∂γ > 0.
Proof that s > p for half-day school option. Substitute b ≡ p/s in (22) so that
b =

(s + xbs)1−α − x(bs)1−α
x
(s + xbs)1−α − s1−α =

(s + xb)1−α − xb1−α
x
(s + xs)1−α − 1
.
Thus, after multiplying with the denominator of the left hand side
0 = (x − b)(1 − xb)1−α − x2b1−α + b = F(x,b).
27One solution is (x,b) = (1,1). Applying the implicit function theorem there exists a continuous










since 0 < α < 1. This implies, since x ≡ (1 + γ/2)1−α, that b is smaller than one for x > 1, i.e.
γ > 0, implying that s is larger than p, at least in the neighborhood of (1,1).
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